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Introduction 
The pu中oseof this paper is to briefly review recent financial reform in 
Japan. The problems出atthe J apanese financia1 system has been facing are 
twofold. First， we have to solve the problem of huge bad loans that major finan-
cia1 institutions have been suffering from as a result of the bursting of the so・
caUed “Bubble Economy." Second， we have to drastica11y reform the Japanese 
fmancial system through the so-called “J apanese Big Bang" so that we are able 
to recover competitive strength in the globalized fmancial markets. It is cer-
tain1y not an easy task for us to solve those two problems simultaneously. Nev-
ertheless， wide-ranging fmancial reform in Japan has been going on now for 
some time and we should carefully watch its outcome. 
Section 1 wi1 discuss central bank reform with particular attention being 
paid to the.revision ofthe Bank of Japan Law of June 1997. 1 show how the 
Bank of Japan has acquq-ed its independence仕omthe govern皿entand how its 
conduct of monetary po1icy has been changed. Section 2 wi1 present a brief 
review about the process of fmancial deregu1ation in J apan since the late 1970s， 
focusing on such once-regulated areas as the separation of inancial institutions， 
interest rate cei1ngs， and capital movements to and from overseas. It wi1 also 
analyze the causes and consequences of the “Bubble Economy" and its eventual 
bursting. Section 3 wi1 discuss the implications of the “Japanese Big Bang" for 
the Japanese financial system. 1 show how the regulatory and supervisory agerト
cies have been changed in Japan， reviewing the shift ofpower from the Ministry 
of Finance to the newly-established Financia1 Supervisory Agency (the present 
Financial Services Agency)， and how pru.dentia1 policy in J apan shou1d be 
changed. 
1. Central Bank Reforrn in Japan 
1.1 The Revision of the Bank of Japan Law 
The new Bank of Japan Law was promulgated in June 1997 and was en-
forced in Apri11998. The old Bank of Japan Law， which was enacted in Febru-
町 1947，was revised after the Ministry ofFinance (MOF) was criticized for the 
self-righteous way it administered the fmancial system，抗itselfbeing reorganized 
in June 1998. Rather ironica11y， it was not rea11y the efforts ofthe Bank of Japan 
(BOJ)， b叫 thestruggles between the MOF and politica1 parties (particu1arly， 
the Liberal Democratic Party) that actually gave birth to the new Bank of Japan 
Law. Nevertheless， the BOJ now enjoys a more independent legal status under 
the new Law than under the old Law. 
Because the old Law was enacted during the Second Wor1d War， the gov-
ernment characterized it with a strong regulatory tone. Article 1 of the old Law 
determined the purposes of the BOJ as follows: 
“TheB創Ikof Japan has as its objective the regu1ation of the currency， the 
control and facilitation of credit and finance， and the maintenance and fostering 
of the credit system， pursuant to the national policy， inorder that the general 
economic activities of the nation might adequately be enhanced." 
Under the old Law， the BOJ was put under the strict control of the MOF 
and was not allowed to be independent from the govemment at al. For example， 
the Prime Minister could dismiss the Govemor and the Deputy Govemor of the 
BOJ when deemed necessary. The Minister of Finance could dismiss the Execu-
tive Directors of the BOJ in the same manner. Furthermore， the MOF could 
issue directives to the BOJ conceming its overall functions， thereby control1ing 
monetary policy as well as prudential policy of the BOJ. 
The new Law c1early states that“the BOJ 's independence regarding cur-
rency and monetary control shall be respected" (Artic1e 3). In accordance with 
that phi1osophy， the new Law guarantees the status to the Govemor， the Deputy 
Govemor， and the other members of the Policy Board of the BOJ iri the sense 
that they shall not be dismissed against their wi1 during their five-year terms 
(Article 25). Moreover， the MOF cannot issue any directives conceming the 
business operations of the BOJ， although it may request a report or relevant 
documents from the BOJ when deemed necessary (Article 58). It should be 
noted， however， that the BOJ is urged to maintain c10se contact with the govem-
ment and to exchange views sufficient1y so that its monetary policy and the 
govemment's economic policy should be mutually harmonious (Article 4). 
The new Law determines that “the objectives of the BOJ are to issue 
banknotes， tocarry out currency and monetary control， and to ensure smooth 
sett1ement of funds among banks and other financial institutions， thereby con-
tributing to the maintenance of an order1y financial system" (Article 1). In 
addition to those objectives， the new Law states that“the principle of currency 
and monetary control of the BOJ shall be aimed at， through the pursuit of price 
stabi1ity， contributing to the sound development of the national economy" (Ar-
ticle 2). Those statements conceming the objectives of the BOJ are not at al 
c1ear since they inc1ude not only the objectives， but also the functions of the BOJ 
such as banknote issue and funds sett1ement. Besides， it is hard to distinguish the 
“objectives" stated in Artic1e 1 from the “principle" stated in Artic1e 2. The 
question ari 
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the financial system as a top priority. We should reiterate that， asthe nation's 
central bank， the BOJ should stick to the maintenance of price stabi1ity and， 
accordingly， the final objective of the BOJ shou1d be focused on it more than the 
new Law has stated. 
1.2 Organizational Change at the BOJ 
The organizational structure of the BOJ was changed several times， even 
under the old BOJ Law. In particular， the Policy Board was established in 1949 
as the supreme decision-making body of the BOJ under the direction of the 
General Head Quarters (GHQ) of the allied forces. Then， the Policy Board 
consisted of seven members: the Govemor of the BOJ， two representatives of the 
govemment， and four members appointed by the cabinet. The pu中oseof estab-
lishing the Policy Board was to democratize the decision欄makirtgprocess of the 
BOJ， but， infact， itbecame dormant under bureaucratic maneuvering by BOJ 
staff and soon it was metaphorically called “the Sleeping Board." Instead， the 
Executive Board， which consisted of the Govemor， the Deputy Govemor and 
the Executive Directors， acted as the de facto decision-making body of the BOJ. 
In May 1990， drastic organizational restructuring of the BOJ， involving al 
its departments， was implemented so that the BOJ would be able to cope with a 
rapidly changing financial environment; namely financial deregulation and the 
globalization of financial markets. For example， the Credit and Market Manage-
ment Department was reorganized so as to integrate the monitoring functions 
vis-a-vis financial institutions with respect to intemational fmance as well as' 
domestic finance. Meanwhi1e， a new Financial and Payment System Department 
was set up in order to assume major responsibi1ity for the prudential supervision 
of financial institutions as well as the maintenance of an efficient and stable 
payment system. Furthermore， consolidating al operations-related departments， 
a new Operations Department was set up so that the BOJ cou1d deal more efi-
ciently with various aspects of funds and securities settlement. 
After the passage of the new BOJ Law through the Diet in 1997， the BOJ 
studied how its organization should be changed in accordance with its philoso-
phy of independence from the government and accountabi1ty towards the Diet 
and the general public. In Apri1 1998， the new Policy Board， which comprised 
the Govemor， two Deputy Govemors and six Deliberative Members， was estab剛
lished as the sole decision-making body of the BOJ. (Accordingly， the Executive 
Board was abolished.) At the same time， further organizational reform took 
effect， asshown in Chart 1. The 13 departments， 2 offices (Secretariat of the 
Policy Boar 
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Department， the Financial and Payment System Department， and the Budget 
and Management Department were changed to become “offices" and their staff 
were placed under the direct orders of the respective Executive Director in 
charge. Third， functions performed by the Credit and Market Management 
Department were transferred to the newly~created Financial Markets Depart~ 
ment， which was put in charge of monetary control， and to the Bank Supervision 
Department， which was put in charge of the survei1ance of financial institutions. 
(Accordingly， the Credit and Market Management Department， which had been 
the most powerful department in the BOJ for a long time， was abolished.) 
Furthermore， inMay 2000， operations related to foreign exchange were 
transferred from the International Department to the Financial Markets Depart~ 
ment so as to strengthen monetary control of the BOJ. 
1.3 Changes of Functions Performed by the BOJ 
The functions of the BOJ do not differ much from those performed by other 
central banks. Namely， the BOJ performs three major functions: a) issue for the 
currency， b)banker to banks (more precisely， banker to financial institutions)， 
c) banker to government. We should， however， point out some changes in those 
functions in relation to the implementation of the new BOJ Law. 
First， the BOJ is the sole note issuer in Japan. The banknotes issued by the 
BOJ are legal tender and have an un1imited circulation for al transactions， both 
public and private. The Issue Department of the BOJ， aswell as its 33 branches 
al over the country， takes care of the bariknotes so that they can be back into 
circulation in good condition. Also， it employs a wide range of measures such 
as watermarks and micro~lettering in order to prevent counterfeiting. 
As for the amount of issue of BOJ notes， the old BOJ Law stated that the 
Minister of Finance should determine its maximum. It also stated that BOJ 
notes must be fully backed up by eligible assets， such as commercial bi1s， loans， 
government bonds， foreign exchange， and gold and si1ver bullion. The new BOJ 
Law， however， has neither the provision concerning the maximum amount of 
issue of BOJ notes nor the provision concerning back~up asets. This is a reflec~ 
tion of the fact that the maximum amount of issue has been repeatedly changed 
in parallel with the increasing demand for BOJ notes. It is also a reflection of 
the widely~supported recognition that .the value of BOJ notes is not necessarily 
related to what the BOJ has as its asets. Consequently， under the new Law， the 
BOJ has been given the discretionary power of contro1ing the issue of BOJ 
notes. This means， inturn， that it is the responsibi1ity of the BOJ's monetary 
policy to adequately control the amount of BOJ notes， thereby maintaining the 
value of the currency (i.e.， price stabi1ty). 
Second， asbanker to financial institutions， the BOJ accepts current deposits 
from financial institutions and extends credit to them. The scope of financial 
institutions that it extends credit to is somewhat narrower than the one that it 
accepts current deposits from. BOJ deposits are used as the means of settlement 
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for various transactions among fmancia1 transactions， e.g. ca11 and bi1s transac幽
tions. They are a1so used for the fina1 net sett1ement of obligations among fman-
cia1泊stitutionsunder the Bi1 and Clearing System， the Domestic Fund Trans島r
System (the Zengin System)， and the Foreign Exchange Yen Settlement System. 
Since October 1988， the BOJ operates an electronic funds transfer system， the 
Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET)， inorder to faci1itate 
fund transfers among financial institutions， thereby maintaining an efficient 
sett1ements system. Under the new Law， the BOJ is expected to make contribu-
tions to the smooth functioning of the settlement system among financial institu・
tions (A此ic1e39). cuπ'ently， for example， the BOJ has been restructuring the 
BOJ-NET so as to introduce real time gross settlement (RTGS) for fund trans-
fe四国wellas sett1ement for govemment bonds， thereby reducing sett1ement risk. 
BOJ lending has been a traditiona1 means of providing credit to financial 
institutions. The former Credit and Market Management Department frequently 
uti1zed loans against collateral (in the form of bi1s or government bonds) as a 
means of dai1y reserve adjustments in the money markets. Meanwhi1e， itwas 
advantageous for financial institutions to receive the BOJ loans because the 
officiallending rate was usually maintained below money market rates. Since 
J叫y1995， however， the relationship between the official1ending rate and money 
market rates was reversed and the BOJ (the present Financial Markets Depart-
ment) nearly stopped using its loans部 ameans of daily reserve 叫justment.
However， BOJ lending to troubled financial institutions increased significantly 
in the late 1990s. 
As for the “Lender of Last Resort" function performed by the BOJ， the new 
BOJ Law states that the BOJ may provide uncollateralized loans to financial 
institutions when they unexpectedly experience a temporary shortage of funds 
due to accidental causes， including computer syste皿 troublesCArticle 37). Ac-
cordingly， the BOJ can independent1y cope with cases of liquidity shortage at its 
own judgement. The new Law a1so states that the Minister of Finance may 
request the BOJ to provide 10創18to troubled financial institutions “whendeemed 
necessary for the maintenance of an order1y financia1 system" (Article 38). In 
fact， the MOF (and the FSA) frequent1y requested the BOJ to provide emer-
gency 
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(roost1y， the governroent bonds)， I.e. issuance， registration， coupon payroents， 
and rederoption. The Operations Departroent of the BOJ is responsible for those 
businesses related to the governroent. Meanwhi1e， the Financial Markets Depart開
roent of the BOJ closely roonitors developroents in the foreign exchange roarkets 
and soroetiroes roakes intervention in the roarkets as an agent of the Minister of 
Finance when deeroed necessary. The MOF， however， continues to keep the 
power of intervention in the foreign exchange roarkets and even under the new 
BOJ Law the BOJ needs the authorization froro the Minister of Finance in order 
to intervene in the roarkets (Article 39). 
As for BOJ credit to the governroent， the new BOJ Law states that the BOJ 
roay roake loans， without collateral， tothe governroent， and subscribe or under-
write govemroent bonds as prescribed in the exceptional clause of Article 5 of 
the Fiscal Law (Artic1e 34). It also states that the BOJ roay subscribe or under-
write financial bils or other bi1s issued by the govemroent for teroporary bor-
rowing. This is certainly an undesirable aroendroent to the BOJ law because the 
fmancing of public deficits by central bank credit wi1 loosen fiscal discipline， 
thereby bringing about the problero of inflation afterwards. It should be noted， 
however， that the MOF has started issuing fmancing bi1s (FBs) through public 
coropetitive-price auctions in April 1999， switching froro the traditional way of 
issuing thero through underwriting by the BOJ. 
1.4 Policy Reform of the BOJ 
The BOJ's top priority in iropleroenting roonetary policy is to ensure price 
stabi1ity， although it is also concemed with several other objectives， such as 
econoroic growth， stabi1ity of the foreign exchange rate， and equi1ibriuro of the 
balance of payroents. Such a traditional policy stance of the BOJ has been con-
firroed by Article 2 of the new BOJ Law. Meanwhile， the ro吋orinstruroents of 
roonetary policy for the BOJ are a) changes in the official discount rate， b) 
roarket operations in various bi1s and securities， and c) changes in reserve re-
quireroent ratios. All of these three instruroents involve financial transactions 
between the BOJ and financial institutions. They have a direct iropact upon 
various financial roarkets， through which real econoroic activities as well as price 
levels would be gradually affected. In relation to such a transmission roecha-
nisro， 1 would like to consider how the operating-and interroediate-variables of 
the BOJ's roonetary policy have been changed， orotherwise. 
First， the operating-variables of the BOJ have always been cal and bi1l 
rates， ever since J apan's high growth period in the 1960s. Call and bi1 rates， 
which are representative interest rates in interbank money markets， are deter-
mined through the reserve manageroent of the BOJ. More precisely， under the 
Law Conceming the Reserve Requirement System of 1957， most financial insti-
tutiOIlS in Japan are subject to the reserve requireroent system and are obligated 
to place legal reserve deposits (namely， current deposits) with the BOJ. The 
required reserves of fmancial institutions are calculated as the product of the 
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required reserve ratio and the average outstanding balance of deposits， deben-
tures etc. during one calendar month. A reserve maintenance period begins from 
the 16th of that month and ends on the 15th of the next. Several factors cause 
fluctuations in reserve deposits of financial institutions as a whole and they can 
be summarized in the following equation called “Demand and Supply of Funds 
in Money Markets，" which is equivalent to the equi1brium equation relating the 
demand for and the supply of high-powered money: 
Increase (decrease) in reserve deposits = Inflows (outflows) of banknotes 
+ Payments (receipts) of the Government 
+ Provision (withdrawal) of credit by the BOJ 
The market operations of the BOJ in conducting the reserve management in 
this equation and in controlling cal and bi1 rates were characterized as being 
“defensive." That is， they were “defensive" in the sense that the BOJ neutralized 
fluctuations in the mark~t factor (the first two items on the right hand side) by 
its credit provisions or withdrawals on a dai1y or seasonal basis.お10reover，the 
BOJ controlled the amount of total credit to financial institutions so as to ensure 
that an average outstanding balance of reserve deposits held by financial institu-
tions through a maintenance period eventually became equal to the average 
amount of legal reserve requirement， ignoring the negligible statistical errors. 
Accordingly， Japanese financial institutions maintained excess reserves almost at 
zero and minimized the opportunity cost of holding such non-interest-bearing 
deposits. Under such “defensive" reserve management， the BOJ controlled the 
cal1 and bi1 rates by adjusting the path of the “progress ratio of reserve depos-
its.叫 (Theratio was defined as the ratio of reserve deposits accumulated from 
the first day of a maintenance period against the total cumulative reserve depos-
its required for that period.) When the BOJ intended to put upward pressure on 
cal1 and bi1 rates， it reduced the “ratio" relative to the standard path. On the 
other hand， when the BOJ intended to put downward pressure on cal1 and bi1 
rates， it increased the “ratio." It should be added that the official discount rate 
played a critical role in determining cal1 and bil rates. That is， changes in the 
official discount rate directly influenced cal1 and bi1l rates through the announce-
ment effects by revealing the changes in the BOJ's policy intent to the general 
public. 
On September 15th 1998， the final day of a reserve maintenance period， the 
BOJ provided credit to financial institutions more than sufficient to meet their 
required reserves， thereby reducing cal rates to around 0.25%， which was lower 
than the official discount rate of 0.5 % at that time. Since then， the “defensive" 
reserve management of the BOJ has changed in such a way that financial institu-
tions hold significant amounts of excess reserves through a reserve maintenance 
period. In other words，. the BOJ has started to influence cal and bi1l rates 
through the amount of excess reserves， not through the “progress ratio of reserve 
deposits." 
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Furthermore， asthe BOJ has pursued a so-called “zero占lterest-ratepolicy" 
(by reducing the overnight cal rate almost to zero percent)， the amount of 
excess reserves held by financial institutions as well as the BOJ deposits held by 
money market dealers has increased tremendously. 
Second， inorder to strengthep. the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy， the BOJ has liberalized cal and bil1 markets and has encouraged arbi-
trage transactions among various money markets since the late 1970s. Types of 
transactions were significantly diversified in cal and bil1 markets， while the 
restrictions that prohibited arbitrage between the interbank markets and open 
markets， such as the Gensaki market， were gradually abolished. Meanwhile， new 
open markets were established， such as the certificate of deposit (CD) markets 
in 1979， the treasury bil1 (TB) markets in 1986， and the commercial paper (CP) 
market in 1987. At the same time， the BOJ gradually included these new open-
market-instruments within its market operations， e.g. CD operations in 1986， CP 
operations in 1989， and TB operations in 1991. 
As a consequence， various short-term interest rates in the intぽbankand 
open markets in Japan now move almost in parallel with each other through the 
active arbitrage transactions among those markets. If the BOJ controls cal and 
bil rates as its operating targets， it can also control the interest rates in the other 
money markets. In other words， the BOJ has secured the smooth transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy， atleast within the boundary of various money 
markets. It should be noted that the markets for short-term government securi-
ties such as TBs and FBs， which have remained underdeveloped in Japan even in 
the 1990s， have at last become the core market for the BOJ's operations since last 
year. This is because the MOF has started issuing FBs through public competi-
tive-price auction in April 1999. 
Third， among the various financial variables that can be treated as interme-
diate targets of monetary policy， the BOJ has paid closest attention to the 
broadly-defined money stock since the latter half of the 1970s. This is because 
the BOJ recognized the importance of controlling the money stock from its own 
experience of the great inflation in 1973ー74.More precisely， inthe third quarter 
of 1978， the BOJ began to announce quarterly forecasts for broad money (M2 at 
first and M2 + CDs since the second quart 
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gradually lowering the growth rates of M2 + CDs during the late 1970s and the 
ear1y 1980s. Meanwhi1e， the rates of increase in nominal GDP and in the GDP 
deflator followed a declining tend almost in parallel with those of M2十CDs.
In contrast， the growth rates for M2 + CDs accelerated into double開digits
during the period from the second quarter of 1987 to the frst qu紅 terof 1989 
and stock prices continued to so紅 totheir historica1y highest levels around the 
end of the 1980s. Also rea1 estate prices rose sharply， a1most in para1el with 
stock prices. Such sharp hikes in asset prices constituted the so伺called“Bubble
Economy" in Japan. Then， asa resu1t of monetary tightening by the BOJ from 
Apri11989 to July 1991， the growth rate for M2+CDs indicated a sharp decline， 
to around 0%， during 1992-93. CNegative growth rates in the fourth quarter of 
1992 and in the first quarter of 1993 were recorded.) At the same time， stock 
prices as well as real estate prices declined sharply and Japan experienced the 
bursting of the “Bubble Economy" after 1990. 1 examine the causes and conse-
quences of the “Bubble Economy" in more detail in Section 2. 
After having experienced the “Bubble Economy" during the late 1980s and 
its bursting afterwards; the BOJ began to question the stability of the relation-
ship between the rate of growth of M2 + CDs and the rate of inflation， measured 
by genera1 price indices. The BOJ argued that inflation， asmeasured by the 
consumer price index C CPI) and the wholesale price index CWPI) ， remained 
stable at a relatively low level despite abrupt changes in the growth rate of 
M2 + CDs and that monetary po1icy should shift towards the “comprehensi ve 
judgement" approach. In other words， the BOJ began to downgrade the impor-
tance ofthe money stock as the intermediate target ofits monetary policy. How-
ever， we should remember that the double digit growth of M2 + CDs during the 
late 1980s was one of the major reasons for the “Bubble Economy，" and that the 
BOJ was obviously responsible for the mishand1ing of the money stock during 
that period. 
Last， but not least， it should be pointed out that the most immediate task for 
the BOJ's monetary policy at the present moment is not to fight against the 
inflation problem， but to conquer the deflation problem as an aftermath of the 
bursting of the “Bubble Economy." As the Japanese economy has been experi-
encing a prolonged recession in the late 1990s， the BOJ has to fight， for the t 
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a so-called “zero-interest-rate policy" (by reducing the ovemight cal rate almost 
to zero percent) since February 1999. 
Although the BOJ has lifted the “zero-interest-rate policy" in August 2000， 
the J apanese economy has sti1 been experiencing a rather serious problem of the 
deflation. We may consider that such extreme interest-rate policy has revealed 
the limitations of the traditional policy regime of the BOJ that focused most of 
its attention on the cal rate. N ow is the time for the BOJ to fully reconsider its 
traditional tactics and the strategy of monetary policy. 
2. Financial Deregulation and the “Bubble Econom.y" 
2.1 Categorization of Japanese Financial Institutions 
Japanese financial institutions can be categorized as shown in Chart 2， based 
on the type of business conducted and the identity of their customers: The clas-
sification is done in the following three stages. 
The first stage is whether a financial institution is private or public. The 
public financial system has quite a big share in the Japanese financial system. In 
particu1ar， the Postal Saving System， which is operated by the Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications， collects deposits from the public through its extensive 
network of about 24，000 post offices nationwide. At the present moment it 
accounts for about one third of total deposits held by the household sector in 
Japan. The Trust Fund Bureau of the MOF accepts funds from the Postal Sav-
ing System together with those from other sources and makes loans and/or in-
vestments to public financial institutions as well as public corporations， public 
enterprises， and local govemments through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Pro-
gram. Inc1uded among these public fmancial institutions is the Development 
Bank of Japan， the Japan Bank for International Co-operation， the Housing Loan 
Corporation， and so on.4 
As the second stage of the classification， private financiaI institutions are 
divided into financiaI intermediaries and other financial institutions. The Iatter 
inc1ude securities companies (such as Nomura Securities). They play a key role 
in securities markets in J apan through their engagement in brokerage， dealing， 
selling， and underwriting of stocks and bonds. They aIso deal in CDs and offer 
various investment funds， such as money market funds (MMFs). AIso inc1uded 
among the Iatter are money market dealers， which engage in brokerage and 
dealing in short-term money market instruments in collaboration with the BOJ. 
As the third stage of the c1assification， the private financial institutions are 
divided into depositary institutions and non-depository institutions. Depository 
institutions consist of four types: ordinary banks (commercial banks) ， Iong-term 
financial institutions， financiaI institutions for small businesses， and financiaI 
institutions for agricu1ture， forestry， and fishery. First， ordinary banks consist of 
city banks， regional banks， and second-tier regionaI banks (once categorized as 
Sogo b 
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most important institutions in the Japanese financial system as the so-called 
“Main Banks" of large Japanese corporations. Second， long-term financial insti-
tutions consist of long胴termcredit banks (such as the lndustrial Bank of Japan) 
and trust banks (such as Mitsubishi Trust Bank). However， itshould be noted 
that long-term credit banks have actually vanished after the failures of the Long-
Term Credit Bank 01 Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank in 1998. Besides， the 
lndustrial Bank of Japan set up a fmancial holding company together with 2 city 
banks in October 2000. Third， financia1 institutions for sma11 businesses consist 
of Shinkin banks (and the Shinkin Central Bank as their central organization)， 
credit co・operatives(and the National Federation of Credit Co-operatives as their 
central organization)， the Shokochukin Bank and labor credit associates. Fourth， 
financial institutions for agriculture， forestry and fishery are organized at the 
national， prefecture， and municipallevels. The Norinchukin Bank acts as a cen-
tral organization in such a three-tier financial system for Japanese primary in-
dustries. It is the biggest institutiona1 investor回 Japan， holding the largest 
portfolio of J apanese govem皿entbonds. 
Finally， included among non-depository financial institutions are insurance 
companies， which are divided into life-insurance companies (such as Nihon Life 
lnsurance) and non-life insurance companies (such as Tokyo Marine and Fire 
lnsurance). Also inc1uded among this group of institutions are housing finance 
companies (Jusens)， consumer credit institutions， securities finance compani田
and so on. It should be noted that most of the Jusens have already fai1ed. 
2.2 Deregulation of tbe Separation of F加ancialInstitutions 
The J apanese tinancial system has been characterized by rather strict func・
tional sep町ationamong different categories of tinancial institutions. Such sepa幽
ration of functions has been observed between banks and securities companies， 
between long-term financial institutions and short-term financial institutions， 
between deposit banks and trust banks， and between insurance companies and the 
other financial institutions. 
The separation of banking business from securities business existed even 
before the Second W orld War as an informal practice， although there were no 
legal provisions conceming such separation. In the post-war period， the separa-
tion was legally established by Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law of 
1948， which was basically a Japanese version of the Glass-Steagall Act in the 
United States. The Article prohibited banks仕omengaging in securities business 
except in cases where there was an investment purpose or a trust contract. Also 
allowed as exceptions were banks' businesses of government bonds， local govem-
ment bonds， and govern血 ent-guaranteedbonds. However， inactua1 practice， 
banks engaged only in the underwriting of government bonds during Japan's 
high growth period in the 1960s. The other bond businesses allowed by the Law 
錨 exceptionalcases were in fact prohibited by the administrative guidance 
(Gyosei Shido) of the MOF in order to restrict competition between banks and 
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securities companies. 
The separation of long-term finance from short-term finance has been based 
on the commercial banking phi1osophy simi1ar to that of the United Kingdom. 
The phi1osophy is to make clear distinctions between commercial funds related 
to transactions of commodities and manufacturing funds related to production in 
various manufacturing sectors. After the Second World War， the Long-Term 
Credit Bank Law was enacted in 1952 and， accordingly， long-term credit banks， 
which specialized in long-term fmance and could float financial debentures， were 
established. The maturity of financial debentures issued by long-term credit 
banks was set at five years. On the other hand， depository financial institutions 
(such as city banks) were not allowed to issue deposits with a maturity of longer 
than three years unti1 1998. A1though there were no legal provisions regarding 
the maturity of funds raised by those depository financial institutions， the MOF 
exercised an administrative guidance over the maturity of deposits in order to 
restrict competition between fmancial debentures issued by long-term credit 
banks and deposits issued by depository financial institutions. 
As for the separation between banks and trust banks， which are another 
long-term financial institution， banks were once permitted to conduct trust busi-
ness as well as banking business when the former trust companies were converted 
into banks in 1948. In 1952， however， the MOF started to promote the separa-
tion between banks and trust banks through forcing trust departments of banks 
to merge with trust banks. Accordingly， quite a limited number of banks (such 
as Daiwa Bank) continued to engage in trust business after then. 
Finally， the separation between insurance companies and the other financial 
institutions was most strictly enforced by the MOF in the sense that only insur.司
ance companies could engage in insurance businesses. Furthermore， even among 
insurance companies， there was a clear separation between life insurance compa-
ni田 andnon-life (marine and fire) insurance companies. 
Regulations concerning the business areas of financial institutions have been 
liberalized starting from the late 1970s， and such deregulation has accelerated 
during the 1980s. For example， banks were allowed to handle many securities 
businesses， starting with the over-the-counter sale of public bonds (government 
bo 
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cial System" which recommended the restructuring of the Japanese financial 
system. It conc1uded that mutual cross-entries among individual financial cate-
gories in the form of separated subsidiaries would be the appropriate approach 
to take towards a new Japanese financial system. At the same time， the Securi-
ties and Exchange Council， another advisory body to the Minister of Finance， 
published a report on the revision of regulations concerning the separation be-
tween banking business and securities business. It concluded that the establish-
ment of separated subsidiaries would be appropriate， too. Subsequently， the Law 
concerning the Reform of the Financial System was enacted in June 1992 and it 
became possible for ordinary banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks， and 
securities companies to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries in the designated finan-
cial categories， starting from April 1993. A1though there were sti1 important 
restrictions in terms of the type of securities business which banks' could engage 
in (e.g. banks were not allowed to engage in stock-brokerage)， the first securities 
subsidiaries formed by 2 long-term credit banks， 2 trust banks and the Norin・
chukin Bank started operation in July 1993. Similar1y， subsidiary trust banks 
formed by 4 securities companies and the Bank 01 Tokyo (the current Tokyo-
Mitsubishi Bank) started operation in October 1993. Meanwhile， the big city 
banks had to wait for a whi1e before setting up securities subsidiaries and/or 
trust subsidiaries since the MOF worried about the “adverse" impact of those 
entries upon small securities companies and trust banks. 
The timing of deregulation in insurance business was a litle later than in the 
other financial businesses. In 1992， the Insurance Counci1， another advisory 
body to the Minister of Finance， published a report on the revision of the Insur-
ance Business Law. Subsequently， the Law was revised in June 1995 so that 
mutual cross-entries between life insurance companies and non-life (marine and 
fire) insurance companies were admitted in the form of separated subsidiaries. 
2.3 Deregulation of Interest Rates Ceiling and 
Foreign Exchange Control 
In addition to the separation of financIal institutions， the regulation of inter-
est rates and the control of foreign exchange transactions have characterized the 
J apanese financial system. 
The agreement on regulating deposit interest rates had its origin in the pre欄
war experiences of repeated banking crises in J apan. There was a strong fear that 
interest rate competition in gathering deposits would weaken the soundness of 
depository financial institutions. In December 1947， the Temporary Interest 
Rate A司justmentLaw was promulgated and implemented. The Minister of 
Finance determined whether or not interest rate regulation was necessary in the 
light of general economic conditions and then， ifnecessary， the Policy Board of 
the BOJ determined the upper limits on deposit interest rates after having con-
su1ted with the Interest Rate Adjustment Council. Since then， the regulation of 
deposit interest rates was strictly maintained for a long period of time and， in
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fact， was always binding. 
Deposit interest rates were steadily liberalized after 1979 when banks started 
to issue negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs). Large-denomination time de-
posits bearing market interest rates as well as large-denomination money market 
certificates (MMCs) were first introduced in 1985. Restrictions on minimum 
amount and maturity of these new deposits with libera1ized interest rates were 
gradually relaxed thereafter. Interest rates on time deposits became virtually free 
of any regulation in 1993 and interest rates on demand deposits were fully liber-
alized in 1994， except those on checking accounts (Touza-Yokin) with zero per-
cent regulation. 
Now， letus turn our attention to foreign 悶 changecontrol. During the high 
growth period in Japan， there was a clear segmentation between domestic and 
foreign financial markets because of rather strict control of foreign exchange. 
However， after Japan had shifted from a fixed exchange rate system to a flexible 
exchange rate system in 1973， such strict control of foreign exchange was gradu-
ally eased in line with the intemational trend of libera1izing capital movements 
across borders. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was 
fully revised in 1980 and the basic principles concerning intemational capital 
movements changed from one of“prohibition" to one of “freely al1owed，" 
though regulated in case of emergency. 
In May 1984， the Joint Japan-U.S. Ad Hoc Group on the Yen/Dollar Ex-
change Rate issued a report and suggested a number of measures to deregulate 
the raising and investing of funds by both Japanese and foreign financial institu-
tions in order to promote the intemationalization of the yen. Inc1uded among 
those measures were the removal of yen-conversion limits of banks， the liberali-
zation of Euroyen trading， and the elimination of the so-ca11ed “real demand 
rule" for forward exchange transactions. (The rule stated that forward exchange 
transactions between banks and their customers should be based on “real" trans-
actions， such as commodity trade.) The lifting of yen-conversion limits contrib-
uted to expanding Euroyen interbank transactions as wel1 as interbank 
Eurodol1ar transactions with foreign exchange swaps. Those transactions， in
turn， contributed to increased arbitrage between domestic interbank and open 
markets. The elimination of the“real demand rule" contributed to t 
2.4 The “Bubble Economy" and its Bursting 
In the late 1980s， there were significant changes in the environment sur-
rounding financial institutions in J apan. Deregulation of the separation of finan-
cial institutions， interest rate cei1ngs， and foreign exchange control al con-
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tributed to increased competition among fmancia1 institutions. The most con-
spicuous response仕omdepository fmancia1 institutions， particularly ordinary 
banks， tothe ac佃al(or potentia1) loss of their f同nchiseva1ue was to expand 
loans to les traditional areas， such as the rea1 estate industry and non-bank 
firms. Moreover， many of those n01トbankswere bank affiliates whose purpose 
was to lend to real estate companies and to make equity investments. Banks also 
expanded their equity portfolios， directly or indirectly through special trust 
funds (Tokkin). Simi1ar behavior was observed on the part of long-term credit 
banks， trust banks and many of the financial institutions for agriculture， forestry， 
and fishery. 
As has already been stated， the stock prices in Japan continued to soar dur-
ing the late 1980s apart from a temporary fa1 on “Black Monday" in October 
1987. The Nikkei 225 stock price index rose 仕oman average of 12，565 in 1985 
to an average of 34，058 in 1989. Meanwhi1e， the increase in rea1 estate prices in 
central Tokyo had already started in the ear1y 1980s， but accelerated sharply 
around 1986-87. The rapid increase in land prices gradual1y spread to the sub幽
urbs of Tokyo and to other major cities in Japan. Several non-monetary factors 
could be cited as the background to the increase in land prices. That is， a)the 
demand for offices increased in the metropol江anarea as Tokyo became one of 
the wor1d's financia1 centers，阻db) there were favorable tax treatments for 
investments in land with respect to inheritance tax and capital gains tax. 
It was a1so true that the economic environment and macroeconomic policy 
contributed significant1y to the increase in those asset prices. The Japanese econ・
omy， which had been in recession due mainly to the deflationary impact of the 
substantial appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accord in September 1985， 
exhibited significant recovery in 1987 and 1988. However， the BOJ didn't 
change its easy monetary policy unti11989， because the general price index， such 
as the CPI and the WPI， remained stable due to the appreciation of the yen， in
stark contrast to the sharp rises in asset prices. 
In May 1989， the BOJ tightened its monetary policy by raising its officia1 
discount rate from 2.5 % to 3.25 %. (After that，江wasraised another four times 
until it reached 6% in August 1990.) Meanwhile， inMarch 1990， the MOF 
urged private banks to contain the growth in their loans related 
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Agency in December 1998， we can statistically summarize the “Bubble Econ-
omy" in the late 1980s and its bursting after 1990 as follows. The market value 
of shares increased from 242 tri1ion yen at the end of 1985 to 890 tri1ion yen at 
the end of 1989， and then decreased to 335 tri1ion yen at the end of 1997. The 
market value of1and increased from 1，004 tri1ion yen at the end of 1985 to 2，365 
tri1ion yen at the end of 1990， and then decreased to 1，659 tri1ion yen at the end 
of 1997. That is， total capitallosses associated with shares and land from their 
peaks to the end of 1997 amounted to more than 1，261 tri1ion yen， which was 
equivalent to 2.5 times of the nominal GDP of 505 tril1ion yen in 1997. It should 
be noted that outstanding loans by private financial institutions increased from 
395 tri1ion yen at the end of 1985 to 660 tri1ion yen at the end of 1990 and then 
further increased to 702 tri1ion yen at the end of 1997. 
The quality of loans provided by those financial institutions deteriorated as 
asset prices fel rapidly. Particular1y， most of the loans to real estate companies， 
construction companies， and norトbanksturned out to be non-performing loans. 
In October 1992， the MOF published a report on current policy concerning the 
non-performing loan problem. The MOF admitted that the total amount of 
non-performing loans (bankrupt loans and loans with no interest payments for 
six months or more) held by city banks， long-term trust banks， and trust banks 
reached 12.3 tri1ion-yen at the end of September 1992. The problem continued 
to expand after then. At the end of September 1995， the tota1 amount of non-
performing loans (defined as the sum of bankrupt or past due loans and restruc-
tured loans) held by member banks of the Federation of Bankers Association of 
Japan (Zenginkyo) stood at 31 tri1ion yen. Included among those member 
banks are city banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks， regional banks， and 
second-tier regional banks. At the end of September 1998， the total amount of 
“problem loans" (the much wider definition of non-performing loans) jumped to 
73 tri1ion yen. It increased further to 80 tri1ion yen at the end of March 1999. 
Meanwhile， according to the self-assessments made by those member banks in 
March 2000， the total amount of credit that was included in risk categories I， 
II， and IV (doubtful credits) stood at 81 tri1ion yen， which was 12.1 % of their 
total credit amounting to 672 tri1lion yen.6 
2.5 The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry 
There were not many changes in the landscape of the J apanese financial 
industry during the high growth period in the 1960s and through the stable 
growth period in the latε1970s and the early 1980s. Regulatory bodies in Japan， 
primari1y the MOF， strictly controlled new entries into each category of finan-
cial institution. Besides， the number of failures of financial institutions was quite 
limited due to the various regulations that restricted competitive forces. How-
ever， such a static landscape started to abruptly change as a result of the bursting 
ofthe “Bubble Economy" in the 1990s. Some financial institutions， including 
major banks (city banks， long-term credit banks， and trust banks) went into 
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bankruptcy because of the burden of non-performing loans， whi1e other financia1 
institutions were forced to merge under the more competitive environment than 
before. 
At the end of March 1992， there were 1 city banks， 3 long-term credit 
banks， 7 trust banks， 64 regional banks， 66 second-tier regional banks， 440 
Shinkin banks， and 397 credit co-operatives. Then， the total number of deposi-
tory financial institutions that belonged to those seven categories was 988.7 At 
the same time， there were also 210 securities companies， 27life insurance compa-
nies， 25non-life insurance companies， 8 housing finance compani回 (Jusen)and 
so on. The following were the major changes that happened in several categories 
of financial institution after then. 
First， among the city banks， the long-term credit banks， and the trust banks， 
four m吋orfinancial groups have been going to be formed. In August 1999， the 
lndustrial Bank of Japan， the Daiichi・KangyoBank， and the Fuji Bank agreed to 
merge by April 2002 and set up a financial holding company named the Mizuho 
HD (Holding) in September 2000. In April 2000， the Sumitomo Bank and the 
Sakura Bank agreed to merge and to establish a new bank named the Mitsui-
Sumitomo Bank by Apri1 2001. In April 2000， the Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank and 
the Mitsubishi Trust Bank agreed to set up a financial holding company named 
the Mitsubishi-Tokyo Financial Group by April 2001. In October 2000， the 
Sanwa Bank， the Tokai Banιand the Toyo Trust Bank agreed to set up a finan-
cial holding company named the UFJ (United Financial Group of Japan). 
Meanwhi1e， the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank fai1ed in November 1997. The Long-
term Credit Bank and the Nippon Credit Ban.k failed in October and November 
1998 respectively. 
Second， there occurred several fai1ures of second-tier regional banks unti1 
1996. For example， the Toho Sogo Bank fai1ed in Apri11992. Then， fai1ed the 
Hyogo Bank in 1995， the Tiαiheiyo Bank in May 1995， and the Hanwa Bank in 
November 1996. Furthermore， there occurred five fai1ures of second-tier re-
gional banks in 1999， i.e.， the Kokumin Bank in April， the Kohuku Bank in May， 
the Tokyo Sowa Bank in June， the Namihaya Bank in August， and the Niigata 
Chuo Bank in October respectively. Also， many of Shinkin banks as well as 
credit co-operatives fai1ed. At the end of March 2000， the total number of 
Shinkin banks and credit co-operatives decreased to 386 and 292 respectively as 
a result of those fai1 
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Life Insurance and the Kyowa L砕Insurancein October ofthe same year. Mean-
whi1e， several cases of mega mergers among major insurance companies have 
been rapidly proceeding in 2000. 
Fifth， and the last， 7 out of the 8 housing finance companies (Jusens) fai1ed 
and the Housing Loan Administration Corporation took over their assets in 
August 1996. 
3. The “]apanese Big Bang" and Supervisory ReforIn 
3.1 The “Japanese Big B佃 g"
In November 1996， Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a financial de・
regulation package for drastically refor血 ingthe J apanese financial system. The 
aim of the package was to revitalize the Japanese (particular1y Tokyo) fmancial 
market by transforming it to a “free， fair， and global" market by the year 2001. 
The “free" market meant a libera1ized market under market principles; the “fair" 
market meant transparent and reliable markets; and the “global" market meant 
an internationaI and advanced market. The fmancial deregulation package was 
named the “Japanese Big Bang" after “The Big Bang" of the London financia1 
market in October 1986. 
Such drastic reform of the Japanese financial system was proposed at that 
time because the J apanese financial market had been gradually “hollowing out" 
in the 1990s. For example， transaction volume in the Tokyo stock exchange 
decreased sharply after 1990. And many J apanese companies cOJ;ltinued to issue 
their corporate bonds in overseas markets， avoiding the cumbersome procedure 
of issuing in the domestic bond market. Meanwhile， inthe 1990s， the growth 
rates of transaction volume in the Tokyo foreign exchange market became sig-
nificantly Iower than the growth rates in the New York and the London foreign 
exchange markets. Moreover， the use ofthe yen as an international currency was 
not advanced at al. Such “hollowing out" phenomena observed in the 1990s 
were partly due to the bursting of the “Bubble Economy，" but they were also due 
to the insufficient infrastructure of the Japanese financial system， e.g. remaining 
various financial regulations， unfavorable tax system for investors， and opaque 
accounting system.8 In fact， we should admit that the gradual process of finan-
cial deregulation in Japan since the late 1970s was too slow to catch up with the 
rapid developments in the other globalized fmancial markets (not only in New 
York and London， but a1so in Hong Kong and Singapore). 
In response to the initiative of Prime Minister Hashimoto， the MOF acted 
quickly as a promoter of the “Japanese Big Bang，" realizing that its power of 
financial administration was at stake. In November 1996， the Minister of Fi-
nance Mitsuzuka requested each of the five counci1s (the Securities and Ex-
change Counci1， the Business Accounting Counci1， the Financial System 
Research Counci1， the Insurance Council， and the Foreign Exchange Counci1) to 
s阻此 deliberationson the reform pr 
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for abolition of almost al ofthe foreign exchange controls. Accordingly， inMay 
1997， the Diet passed a bi1 to amend the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law， which was renamed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law 
and was enforced in Apri11998. Under the new Law， the purchase and sale of 
foreign currencies was liberalized， and the permission and prior notification 
requirement on capital transactions was abolished. That is， the liberalization of 
cross-border securities transactions and foreign deposits has greatly expanded the 
choice of investments for business companies as well as for individuals. Besides， 
many business companies have benefited from the liberalization of the foreign 
exchange netting scheme. Such drastic deregulation of foreign exchange control 
as well as capital movements to and from overseas has been called the “front 
runner" of the “Japanese Big Bang." 
Subsequently， inJune 1997， the Financial System Research Counci1， the 
Securities and Exchange Council， and the Insurance Counci1 submitted to the 
Minister of Finance reports on specific measures for financial reform in the areas 
ofbanking business， securities business， and insurance business respectively. All 
the reports included specific measures for financial reform and proposed target 
dates for the implementation of those measures， although the stance for fmancial 
reform varied significantly among them. On the one hand， the report by the 
Securities and Exchange Counci1 took the most active stance for the implemen-
tation of a financial reform. On the other hand， the report by the Insurance 
Counci1 took a rather defensive stance， trying to protect the vested interests of 
the insurance industry. Summing up the reports submitted by the individual 
counci1s， the MOF released a report entitled “Financial System Reform" with 
the timetable and details of the reform attached. Then， inJune 1998， the Diet 
passed the so-called “Financial System Reform Law，" which amended 22 related 
laws (Banking Law， Securities and Exchange Law， Insurance Law， and so on). 
The contents of the“Financial System Reform Law" are too extensive to be 
covered item by item. Nevertheless， they can be summarized， with reference to 
the MOF's report in June 1997， from the following four perspectives. First， the 
Law aims to expand choice for investors and borrowers. More .specifically， the 
ban on securities derivatives ( 
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a registration regime in December 1998， and brokerage commission for stock 
trading was fully liberalized by October 1999. Furthermore， restrictions on 
borrowing instruments (bonds and CPs) of non-bank financial firms were abol-
ished in May 1999. It should be noted that holding companies for financial 
institutions were allowed in December 1997. 
Third， the Law aims to develop a more useful market. More specifically， 
the restriction of off-exchange market trading for exchange-listed stocks was 
abolished in December 1998. (The electronic-based private transaction system 
for stocks was liberalized.) And， the registered OTC stock market (JASDAQ) 
wi1l be improved so that it can function equally well as the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change. Meanwhi1e， inthe short-term money markets， competitive price auc-
tions of FBs were implemented for the first time in Apri1 1999， ashas already 
been stated in Section 1. 
Fourth， but by no means least， the Law aims to establish a framework and 
rules for fair and transparent transactions. More specifically， the accounting 
system has been improved to some extent in the sense that there has been a shift 
towards the disclosures based on consolidated accounting， starting from Apri1 
1999. And， starting from April 2001， new accounting standards for financial 
instruments， such as securities and derivatives， wi1l be established so as to intro-
duce extensively the use of market value accounting (MV A). Moreover， the 
Law aims to formulate rules， which govem the explanation of non-depository 
financial products to consumers. In July 1999， the Financial Counci1 of the 
MOF published an interim report and pointed out that clear rules conceming the 
merchandising and solicitation of various new financial products (such as de-
rivatives and investment trusts) were necessitated. Accordingly， the Financial 
Services Act， which sets rules for financial transactions and protects consumers， 
has been promulgated in May 2000 and will be enforced in April 2001. Mean-
whi1e，“prompt corrective action，" based on capital ratios， was introduced in 
Apri1 1999， asis mentioned later in this Section， and new measures for prevent-
ing intemational money laundering were taken on enactment of the new Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Law in April 1998.9 
3.2 Changing Supervisory Agencies and the Safety N et 
Almost in parallel with the implementation of the “Japanese Big Bang，" the 
regulatory and supervisory regime of the Japanese financial system， including the 
MOF itself， has experienced rapid change in the late 1990s. Before assessing the 
implications of such changes for prudential policy in Japan， 1 will briefly review 
how the regulatory and supervisory agencies， including the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation， have already been changed. 
After the Second World War， the MOF continued to be the dominant power 
with respect to fl'nancial regulation and supervision. According to the Ministry 
of Finance Law of 1949， the MOF was responsible for the following seven areas 
of administration; a) treasury， b)currency， c)finance， d)foreign exchange， e)
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securities transactions， f)mint， and g) printing. Before the drastic reorganiza-
tion in 1998， the organization of the MOF consisted of the Minister's secretariat 
and 7 bureau such as the Budget Bureau， the Tax Bureau， the Customs and Tar-
ifs Bureau， the Financial Bureau， the Securities Bureau， the Banking Bureau， 
and the Intemational Finance Bureau.10 Among those bureau of the MOF， the 
Banking Bureau， the Securities Bureau， and the Intemationa1 Finance Bureau 
played an important role as regulatory and supervisory agencies for various types 
of fmancia1 institutions. First， the Banking Bureau was responsible for the regu-
lation and supervision of most of the fmancia1 institutions， such as city banks， 
long-term credit banks， trust banks， regional banks， second-tier regional banks， 
and Shinkin banks， under the Banking Law and other special laws. Also， its
Insurance Department was responsible for the regulation and supervision of 
insurance companies. Second， the Securities Bureau was' responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of the Stock Exchange and securities companies 
under the Securities and Exchange Law. Third， the Intemational Finance Bu-
reau was responsible for the regulation and supervision of capita1 movements to 
and from overseas under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade ControlLaw. 
In addition to those three bureau， the Inspection Depar回 entof the Minister's 
Secretariat conducted on-site examinations of financial institutions， whi1e the 
Securities and Exchange Survei1ance Commission played a role as the guardian 
of securities transactions in genera1. 
A1though the MOF has been the major regulatory and supervisory agency 
for almost al Japanese financial institutions， inc1uding public financial institu-
tions， there are some exceptions. For example， credit unions are under the direc-
tion of prefecture govemments. Meanwhile， the Shokochukin Bank is primarily 
under the direction of the Ministry of Intemationa1 Trade and Industry， and 
financia1 institutions for agriculture， forestry， and fishery are primarily under the 
direction of the Ministry of Agriculture， Forestry， and Fishery. As for the pub-
1ic financial institutions， the most notable exception is the Postal Saving System， 
which is solely managed by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. 
In the late 1990s， the mighty MOF began to be sharply crificized by political 
parties (particul 
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December 1996， the ruling coalition parties reached an agreement such that the 
Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) should be newly established as an agency 
of the Prime Minister's Office and that it should be in charge of inspection and 
supervision of private fmancial institutions. They also reached an agreement 
such that the Banking Bureau and the Securities Bureau of the MOF should be 
abolished. 
The Diet passed a bil to establish the FSA in June 1997. Subsequently the 
FSA was established in June 1998 as the agency that is mainly responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of private financial institutions. At the same time， the 
MOF was drastically reorganized. The Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission was transferred from the MOF to the FSA. The Banking Bureau 
and the Securities Bureau of the MOF were abolished， while the Financial Plan-
ning Bureau was newly set up within the MOF in order to be responsible for the 
planning of the financial system. The Minister's Secretariat was reorganized to 
take charge of the supervision of public financial institutions， and the Interna-
tional Finance Bureau was reorganized to some extent and was renamed the 
International Bureau. (See Chart 3.) 
Furthermore， inDecember 1998， the Financial Reconstruction Commission 
(FRC)， with the Minister of State as its chairman， was newly established as a 
temporary agency that would take control of the FSA. The final report of the 
Administration Reform Council， led by the former Prime Minister Hashimoto， 
suggested that the FSA should evolve into the Financial Services Agency (the 
new SFA)， which is to be totally responsible for prudential policy in Japan， 
around the start of 2001. In July 1999， the Diet passed a bil for the Reorgani-
zation of Ministries and Agencies of the Central Govemment. Accordingly， the 
FSA has become the Financial Services Agency (as an agency of the Prime 
Minister's Office) and has absorbed the Financial Planning Bureau of the MOF 
in July 2000. Then， inJanuary 2001， the new FSA will take over the job of the 
FRC and will become responsible for most of the administration of the fmancial 
system. Meanwhile， the MOF wi1l be renamed the Zaimu・sho(the Ministry of 
Finance in English)， which is responsible mainly for the budget， tax collection， 
treasury， and inteIτlational finances. However， it is expected that the Zaimルsho
wi1l continue to be involved in prudential policy， particular1y in 
-22-
Currently the maximum de jure amount of payment is 10 mi1ion yen per 
depositor of a fai!ed financial institution. However， inJune 1995， the MOF 
publicly announced in the report entitled “Reorganizing the Japanese Financial 
System" that there would be no pay-off unti1 the end of March 2001. In other 
words， the MOF guar;加 teedal the deposits of fai1ed financial institutions unti! 
that date， asan emergency measure. Furthermore， inMay 2000， the Deposit 
Insurance Law was revised so that al the deposits wi1 be protected in fu11 
amount unti1 the end of March 2002. Besides， demand deposits will be protected 
in fu11 amount for another one year. 
Financial institutions that are legally obligated to participate in the Deposit 
Insurance System in Japan inc1ude al the following types: a) banks (city banks， 
regional banks， second剛tierregional banks， trust banks， and long圃termcredit 
banks)， b)Shinkin banks， c)credit co叩 eratives，and d) labor credit associates. 
Member institutions must pay insurance premiums， which are calculated by 
multiplying the premium rate and the total amount of insured deposits and other 
liabi1ities. The insurance premium rate was raised from 0.012% of eligible li-
abi1ities to 0.084%加Apri1t996 and has been maintained at that level unti! now. 
(In March 1999， the MOF determined to maintain the premium rate at the same 
level unti1 the end of March 2001.) Meanwhi!e， the deposits and other liabi1ities 
of member institutions that are legally insured under the System are as follows: 
a) deposits， b)instal1ment savings， c)money-in-trust， ofwhich principal is guar司
anteed (such as loan trusts and jointly managed money trusts). However， in
December 1997， the MOF announced that the other liabi1ities of fai!ed financial 
institutions， such as debentures， foreign-currency denominated deposits， and so 
on， which were not legally insured， wou1d be protected， too， until the end of 
March 2001. That is， the safety net by the DIC has been temporarily expanded 
so as to protect most of the liabi1ities of fai!ed fmancial institutions. Further“ 
more， inMay 2000， the Deposit Insurance Law was revised so that debentures 
held by individuals as well as earned interests on deposits would be protected， 
too. 
The Resolution and Collection Bank (RBC) and the Housing Loan Aι 
ministration Corporation (HLAC) have worked closely with the DIC in recent 
cases of fai!ed fmancial institutions. The origin of the RBC 
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the Jusen. In Apri1 1999， the RBC and the HLAC merged to establish the Reso-
lution and Col1ection Company (RCC)， which has been playing an important 
role as a “servicer" by col1ecting bad loans in collaboration with the DIC. 
3.3 The “Convoy" Type Adminis仕ationand Capital Injection 
The MOF's traditional way of administering the financial system was char-
acterized by various kinds of regulations in order to restrict competitive forces 
in financial markets， thereby protecting individual financial institutions. It was 
metaphorical1y described as a “convoyed flet vessels" type (or simply “convoy" 
type) of administration of the financial system in the sense that it protected even 
the weakest financial institution from fal1ing into bankruptcy. However， under 
the circumstances of financial deregulation and internationalization since the 
late 1970s， the “convoy" type administration by the MOF was forced to gradu-
ally change， asit became difficult to maintain regulations that restricted com-
petitive forces. In fact， we can point out some cases where financial institutions 
fel into distress because of reckless management and for other reasons (e.g. the 
fai1ure of Heiwa Sogo Bank in 1985). Therefore， the MOF could not maintain， 
literal1y speaking， the “convoy" type administration even before the bursting of 
the “Bubble Economy." 
In the case of troubled financial institutions， the Banking Bureau of the 
MOF tried to solve the problem by forcing them to be absorbed by much larger 
and/or healthier financial institutions that had close relationships with them. 
AIso， the MOF requested the resignation of the managers of the former institu幽
tions so邸 totake responsibility for their failures. Consequently， the timing and 
the way of solving these cases were solely dependent on the discretion of the 
MOF's senior bureaucrats. In fact， they considered that those cases wou1d offer 
challenging opportunities for showing their administrative skil1s and powers. 
Such a traditional way of dealing with troubled financial institutions was main-
tained even after the “financial assistance" by the DIC was introduced as a legal 
procedure for dealing with troubled financial institutions. In April 1992， the 
DIC provided， for the first time，“financial assistance" to Iyo Bank that acquired 
the fai1ed Toho Sogo Bank. In June 1996， the DIC introduced the “special finan-
cial assistance" that expanded the amount of the “financial assistance" beyond 
the pay-off costs. (The “special financial assistance" is to protect deposits and 
other liabi1ities in ful1 until the end ofMarch 2001.) In December 1997， the DIC 
temporarily expan 
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was near1y exhausted by the end of 1997.13 Moreover， failures of Yamaichi Secu-
rities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997 put the Japanese finan-
cial system into a serious financial crisis and the premium rate that Japanese 
financial institutions had to pay in raising funds in overseas markets (the so・
cal1ed勺apanpremium") jumped up sudden1y. In responding ωthe worsening 
situation， inFebruary 1998， two laws on emergency measures aimed at stabiliz-
ing the Japanese financial system (the so司caUed“FinancialSystem Stabilization 
Law") were promulgated and implemented. According to them， the DIC was 
provided with public funds totaling 30 tril1ion-yen. More precisely， itwas pro-
vided with funds totaling 17 trillion-yen that would be avai1able for use in the 
disposal of troubled financial institutions (the “Special Business Account"). The 
fund was to be disbursed through the RCB， which was reorganized to deal with 
troubled cases of city banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks and so on， in
addition to credit co-operatives. The DIC was also provided with funds totaling 
13 trillion-yen that wou1d be avai1able for recapitalization ofviable private finan-
cial institutions for the sake of stabi1izing the fmancial system (the “Financial 
Crisis Management Account勺.The Financial Crisis Management Examination 
Board， which was established within the DIC in order to implement the 
recapitalization， decided to inject a total of 1.8 tril1ion-yen to 21 major banks 
(city banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks， and regional banks) in March 
1998， after having examined their restructuring plans. (The Long-Term Credit 
Bank and Nippon Credit Bank， both of which fai1ed later in the same year， were 
inc1uded among those 21 major banks.) 
Furthermore， inOctober 1998， nine laws related to the soundness and recon-
struction of the financial system were promu1gated and implemented. Among 
those laws， the so-called“Financial Reconstruction Law" provided a legal frame-
work for the failure resolution of financial institutions， i.e.a) placement under 
the financial reorganization administrator， b)temporary nationalization， and c) 
bridge bank. (It should be noted that the FSA assumed the role of implementing 
those laws from the MOF.) And the public funds avai1able for the DIC were 
enlarged to 60 tri1ion-yen. More precisely， the DIC was provided with addi幽
tional funds totaling 18 tri1ion-yen that 
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the end of March 2001， includes a framework for capital injection using public 
funds， the ful protection of deposits and other liabilities of depository financial 
institutions， and a scheme to establish public bridge banks or temporari1y nation-
alize banks. The total cost of such a safety net has already added up to about 70 
tri1ion yen Cabout 14% of Japanese GDP). Although those emergency meas-
ures were necess紅yin order to cope with the financial crisis in Japan in the late 
1990s， we should be very much concerned about the moral hazard problems that 
the safety network has created for financial institutions as well as depositors. 
3.4 Prudential Policy sased on Market Disciplines 
In order to achieve the purpose of maintaining a sound and stable financial 
system， itis very important to set up a financial environment in which market 
discipline could prevail. Certainly， zero-failures of financial institutions should 
not be considered as the final objective of prudential policy， because the sound-
ness and efficiency of the financial system could not probably be achieved under 
such circumstances. 
In contrast， the “convoy" type administration by the MOF was basically one 
to restrict competitive forces and to protect al financial institutions. The MOF 
relied on measures such as detailed ex開anteregulations and one-on-one guidance 
to individual financial institutions. Consequently， even those financial institu-
tions that were inefficient and exposed for too many risks continued to survive. 
At the same time， however， financial instItutions became indifferent to their risk 
management and their own responsibi1ities. Under such circumstances， itwas 
quite natural that they were encouraged to adopt the “do as・everyone-else-does"
attitude. For example， during the “Bubble Economy" in the late 1980s， most 
Japanese fmancial institutions extended too much credit to the real estate-related 
industry without paying due attention to the concentration risk. 
Another result of the “convoy" type administration was the lack of incen-
tives for Japanese financial institutions to develop new financial products. The 
cumbersome procedure for getting the permission of the MOF in order to intro-
duce new financial products quite often prevented the innovative fmancial insti-
tutions from getting entrepreneurial profits. Consequent1y， Japanese financial 
institutions offered on1y very similar financial products， and the Japanese finan-
cial system was often called “the system without innovations". For example， 
those financial services that have recent1y been introduced or wi1 soon be intro-
duced by the “Japanese Big Bang，" such as options on individual stocks， wrap 
accounts of securities companies， and defined contribution pension plans were 
developed a long time ago in the other major countries. That is， J apan has been 
far behind most major countries in this respect. 
Therefore， first of al， both the regulatory and supervisory agencies and 
financial institutions in Japan must recognize phi1osophies concerning the 
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namely， a “free， fair， and global" market， means that the Japanese markets 
should be changed into one where market disciplines would prevai1. It is ex-
pected that the wide-ranging liberalization measures proposed in the “Japanese 
Big Bang" would promote competition among various types of financial institu-
tions (both domestic and foreign). The increased competition wi1l surely urge 
those financial institutions to be more innovative in developing new fmancial 
instruments in order to survive. It will also urge them to be more skilful in the 
measurement， undertaking， and management of various financial risks in their 
portfolios. 
On the side of the regulatory and supervisory agencies， it is expected that the 
newly established FRC-FSA (and the new FSA) will not continue the “convoy" 
type administration of the MOF， but instead wi1l adopt prudential policy based 
on market discipline. In this regard， the capital ratio requirement a la Basle 
Accord of 1988 has important implications for prudential policy in Japan. That 
is， starting from April 1999， the FRC-FSA (and the new FSA) has adopted the 
“prompt corrective actions" against those financial institutions with low cap~tal 
ratios. More precisely， financial institutions that engage in intemational fmance 
business are now classified by their capital ratio(r) a laBasle Accord as fol1ows: 
a) beingsoundifr28%， b)being under-capitalized if 8%>r~4%， c) being 
significantly under-capitalized if 4% > r孟2%，d) being extremely under同
capitalized if the 2% >r孟0%，and e) being bankrupt if r isnegative. The cut-
off ratios for financial institutions that engage only in domestic finance business 
are 4%，2%， 1%， and 0% in cases a)， b)， c)， and d) respectively. And， infact， 
the FRC・FSA(and the new FSA) have already ordered “prompt corrective 
actions，" by applying those criteria to Kohuku Bank and Hokkaido Bank in April 
1999， toTokyo Sowa Bank and Niigata Chuo Bank in May 1999 and to Namihaya 
Bank in June 1999. Among those banks， Kohuku Ban九TokyoSowa Bank， and 
Namihaya Bank were put into bankruptcy procedures， asdetermined by the 
Financial Reconstruction Law. 
The FRC・FSA(and the new FSA) is also expected to conduct on-site ex-
amination of financial institutions more rigorously than the MOF， which per-
formed a role of not only regulating and supervising， but also protecting and 
promoting financial industries. In April1999， they published the n 
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ing on-site examination (Article 44). The BOJ has recently announced its super-
vision po1icy such that it wi1 strictly check non-performing loans as well as the 
risk management of financial institutions. It is expected that the FRC-・FSA(and 
the new FSA) and the BOJ wi1 c10sely cかoperatewith each other so that they 
can enhance the flexibi1ity of their on-site examinations. 
As 1 have already stated， the FRC-FSA (and the new FSA) has already 
been primari1y responsible for prudential policy in Japan. However， there re-
main several questions conceming the role of the new FSA. First， what should 
be the division of work between the new FSA and the Zaimu-sho in financial 
crisis management? Second， should the public financial system， such as the 
Postal Savings System and public financial institutions， be regu1ated and super-
vised by the new FSA， too? Third， what should be the division (or the integra-
tion) of work between the new FSA and the BOJ in on-site examinations of 
financial Institutions? 
Notes 
1. In providing loans to troubled financial institutions， the BOJ has been insisting 
that the following four criteria should be strict1y observed. First， there must be 
a real threat of systemic risk materializing. Second， there is no alternative to the 
provision of central bank funds. Third， appropriate measures must be taken to 
prevent moral hazard. And fourth， the financial soundn巴:sof the BOJ must not 
be impaired. However， those criteria have not been observed， strict1y speaking， 
in several cases of fai1ure that occurred in the 1990s. 
2. See Suzuki， Kuroda and Shirakawa (1989) for more details about the traditional 
way of reserve management conducted by the BOJ. 
3. In order to cope with the credit crunch， the government introduced an emer-
gency policy package in October 1998. The package included 20 tril1ion-yen 
credit insurance faci1ties avai1able for small companies through the Credit Insur-
ance Public Corporation. Meanwhile， the BOJ temporarily increased the amount 
of CP purchases and introduced a special scheme for providing BOJ loan to 
financial institutions that increased their lending to companies. 
4. In order to streamline the public financia1 system， the Japan Development Bank 
and the Hokkaido and Tohoku Development Co申orationwil1 be merged to be-
come the Japan Policy Investment Bank in October 1999. Similarly， the Export 
and Import Bank of Japan and the Overseas Economic Co“operation Fund wil1 be 
merged to become the International Co-operation Bank in October 1999. 
5. It should be noted that foreign banks are inc1uded in ordinary banks. As of 
end-March 2000， the number of foreign ordinary banks in Japan was 84. 
6. The definitions of credit categories I， II， and IV are as follows. Category I is 
the credit for which banks have judged that detailed management is needed. 
Category II is the credit on which banks doubt collection in ful， but have difi-
culties with accurate estimation of loses. Category IV is the credit that banks 
have judged to be non-collectible or of no value. 
7. At the end of March 1992， there were 47 labor credit associates. Besides this， 
there were 3，446 agricultura1 co-operatives and 1，661 fishery co-operatives. 
Although the number of agricultural and fishery co・operativesis large， it is not 
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appropriate to consider them as being sep町ateinstitutions since they are c10sely 
related to each other under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture， Forestry， 
and Fishery. 
8. As for the unfavorable tax system for investors， the securities transaction tax as 
well as the exchange tax were abolished in Apri11999， whi1e the capital gains tax 
will be reformed in Apri1 2001. 
9. According to the Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange Law of 1998， banks and 
money-exchangers are now lega11y required to verify the identity of 
counterparties for foreign remittance and， incases involving the export or import 
of means of payments (such as cash)， a reporting system involving the customs 
authorities has been introduced. Moreover， inAugust 1999， three laws related to 
the prevention of organized crimes were passed in the Diet. Among those laws， 
measures to prevent money laundering were inc1uded. 
10. Moreover， the Mint Bureau， the Print Bureau， and the Institute for Fisca1 and 
Monetary Studies were special institutions of the MOF headquarters. 
11. It should be noted that the Advisory Group on the Central Bank， the advisory 
counci1 to the Prime Minister Hashimoto， started deliberations on the revision of 
the BOJ Law in the same context and issued its report in November 1996. 
12. The merger between the Fukutoku Bank and the Naniwa Bank， soas to establish 
a new bank named the Namihaya Bank in October 1998， was the only case that 
such amendment of the DIC Law was applied to. The amendment was abolished 
in March 1999 and， later that year， the Namihaya Bank failed (in August 1999). 
13. There were about 30 cases of“financial assistanceヘinc1uding“special financial 
assistance，" provided by the DIC until March 1998. Among them， notable cases 
of failure were the Hyogo Bank and the Kizu Credit Co-operative in August 1995， 
the Taiheiyo Bank in May 1996， the Hanwa Bank in November 1996， and the 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the Tokuyo City Bank in November 1997. 
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Chart 1 The Organization of the Bank of Japan 
Mem加r富ofthf;) Policy Bo在地 (9)
Governor 





Secretariat of the Policy Board Arranges proceedings for Polioy Bard meetings; with the Diet， 
Coordination Division the media， and industry associations; reviews the content and 
Secretaries Division wording of draft proposals for decision at Policy Board meet-
Diet Liaison Division ings and of other important documents from the legal perspec-
Press Division tive; handles legal matters regarding the Bank of Japan Law 
and other laws and ordinances; handles particular matters as 
directed by executives: supports the Executive Auditors in 
auditing; provides administrative servioces for executives; is 
responsible for the safekeeping of official stamps of the Bank 
and executi ves. 
Internal Auditors' Office Audits the Bank's operations. 
Policy Planning Office Plans and formulates monetary policy measures and handles 
Planning Division 1 related matters. 
Planning Division 1 
Policy Research Division 
Financial Markets Department Determines the specifices of daiIy market operations; monitors 
Money and Capital Markets and analyzes developments in financial markets in Japan as welI 
Division as overseas， including foreign exchange markets， and activities 
Op巴nMarket Op日rationsDivi-of financial institution日inthese markets; deals with issues relat-
slOn ing to improvement ofthe functioning of the Japanese financial 
Foreign Exchange Division markets including the foreign exchange market; intervenes in 
the foreign exchange markets for the purpose of stabi1zing the 
exchange rates as the agent of the Minister of Finance and/or 
on behalf of other countrIes' monetary authorities; conducts 
purchases/sales of foreign currencies on behalf of overseas cen-
tral banks and international organizations for the purpose of 
assisting investment of their assets. 
Research and Statistics Depart- Conducts research on the domestic economic and fiscal situa-
ment tion; complies statistics. 
Economic Rcsearch Division 
Economic Statistics Division 
Prics Statistics Division 
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Depatmentj office Functions 
Financial and Payment System Plans and formulates measures that contribute to the mainte-
Office nanc巴ofan orderly financial and payment system. 
Financial System Division 
Payment System Division 
Bank Examination and Conducts on-site examinations and off-site monitoring of client 
Survei1lance Department financial institutions that have current accounts with the Bank; 
Planning Division judges financial institutions' eligibility to hold current accounts 
Examination Division with the Bank and to have access to its lending facilities; deteト
Surveil1ance and Monitoring mines the specifics of credit extension by the Bank to maintain 
Division an orderly financial system; liaises with financial industry asso-
clations. 
International Department Manages external assets held by the Bank; makes arrangements 
Planning and Coordination Di-for investment in yen assets by overseas central bank and inter-
vlslOn national organization; conducts operations for international fi-
Global Economic Research nancial support; liaises with overseas central banks and 
Division international organizations; conducts research on global eco-
Balance of Payments Division nomic and financial conditions; conducts business entrusted to 
it by the Ministry of Finance related to the Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade Law and Foreign Exchange Fund Special 
Account Law. 
Gurrency Issue Departmcnt Conducts planning and operations relating to ba山notes;con-
Planning and Management Di-ducts paymentjreceipt of coins， and examines and takes custody 
vlslOn of them; exchanges banknotes and coins unfit for further circu-
Cash and Custody Division lation; conducts business reIated to cIearing of bils and check; 
Currency Verification Division manages securities and other items entrusted to the Bank for 
safekeeping. 
Operations Department 
Planning and Coordination Di-
Conducts obf abniklisn;g (o2p〉erationsincluding the ufroclhloawsing/:se(l1li〉ndis-
counting of bils; (2) loan extension; (3) purchasingjselling of 
vlslOn bils Cincluding those drawn by the Bank) and s巴curities;(4) 
Operations Control Division borrowing/lending of securities with cash col1ateral; (め accept-
Agency Supervision Division ing deposits; (6) domestic funds transter; (7) taking custody of 
Money Markets Division bi1s叫 S叩伽 as叫伽al;(8)阿 chasin的elIingof go叫
Settlement Service Division and silver bulIion; (9) bidding and underwriting Japanese gov-
Treasury Fund Business Divi-ernment securities; (10) operations relating to treasury funds; 
slOn (11) handling of government affairs related to currency and 
Treasury Accounting Division finance; (12) business operations of policy measures to main-
Government Bond Certificate tain an orderly financial system; and (13) conducting other 
Division banking business of the Bank not Iisted above and operations 
relating to the Bank's agents. 
Information System Services Manages to design and development of the Bank's computer I 
Department systems as reguired in ord巴rto automate thc Bank's business 
Systems Planning Division procedures; operates the Bank's computer systems. 
Systems Development Division 
Systems Operation Division 
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Depatment/office Functions 
Pubic Relations Department 1s responsible for public relationsj dissen').Inates information on 
Pubilc 1nformation Division financial services; administers the Bank's library. 
Documents and Library Divi-
slOn 
Savings 1nformation Division 
Budget and Management Of-Plans and formulates measures relating to the organization and 
fice re唱ourcesof the Bankj is responsible for the Bank's budgeting. 
Planning and Coordination Di-
vlSlOn 
Budget Division 
Human Resources Manage-Handles personnel policy issues relating to recruitment， assess-
ment Department ment of job performance， career planning and training， wages 
Planning and Administration and salaries， the Bank's ethical discipline code， and other as-





Administration Department Condusts administrative operations relating to the following 
Planning and Coordination Di-real estate holdings， supplies， staff welfare， security， transporta-
vlslon tion， payment of expenses， subscription certificates of the 
Premises Management Divi-Bank's capital， mailing， and safekeeping of slips. 
slOn 
General Supplies Division 
Welfare Division 
Security and General Services 
Division 
1nstitute. for Monetary and Studies theoretical， institutional， technological， and historical 
Economic Studies aspects of monetary and economic issuesj collects， preserves， 
Research Division 1 and exhibits historica1 materials and documents related to 
Research Division I monetary and economic issuesj exchanges views on monetary 
Research Division 1I and economic issues with academics. 
Branches The 33 branches mainly conduct operations relating to currency 
i錦ueand banking operations， and research on the economic and 
financial situation in each area. 
Local offices in Japan The Fuchu computer center operates the Bank's systems. The 
other 12 local offices handle some of the operations of the head 
office or branches. 
Oversear Representative Of-The 6 overseas representative offices perform a liaison function， 
fices gather information， and conduct research. 
(Source) The Bank of Japan Homepage (http://www.boj.or担〕
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Chart 3 Reguiatory and Supervisory Agencies in Japan: Pre・andPost-August 1998 
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